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ARE CHOICE EXPERIMENTS INCENTIVE
COMPATIBLE?AT EST WITH QUALITY
DIFFERENTIATED BEEF STEAKS
JAYSON L. LUSK AND TED C. SCHROEDER
This study compares hypothetical and nonhypothetical responses to choice experiment questions. We
test for hypothetical bias in a choice experiment involving beef ribeye steaks with differing quality
attributes. In general, hypothetical responses predicted higher probabilities of purchasing beef steaks
than nonhypothetical responses. Thus, hypothetical choices overestimate total willingness-to-pay for
beef steaks. However, marginal willingness-to-pay for a change in steak quality is, in general, not
statistically different across hypothetical and actual payment settings.
Key words: CVM, conjoint analysis, heteroskedastic extreme value model, hypothetical bias, multino-
mial probit, random parameters logit.
Economists have used choice experiments
(CE) and choice-based conjoint analysis to
estimate the value of nonmarket goods, the
trade-offbetweenenvironmentalorfoodqual-
ity attributes, and market share of novel prod-
ucts (e.g., Adamowicz et al.; Jayne et al.;
Layton and Brown; Lusk, Roosen, and Fox;
Unterschultz et al.). The frequent use of CEs
might be explained by a number of factors.
First, CEs are ﬂexible because numerous at-
tributes can be simultaneously valued. Con-
ventional contingent valuation (CV) methods
require cumbersome repeated questions to
achieve the same level of complexity. Second,
CEs are consistent with random utility the-
ory (Ben-Akiva and Lerman) and Lancaster’s
theory of consumer demand, which posits that
consumers derive utility from consumption of
attributes embodied in a good. Third, indi-
vidual CE questions are typically framed in a
manner that closely resembles consumer pur-
chasingdecisions(e.g.,makingachoiceamong
alternative products).
Because CE questions closely mirror actual
consumer purchasing situations, it has been
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hypothesized that CEs are less prone to one
of the primary drawbacks of the CV method:
hypothetical bias in WTP estimates. Indi-
viduals often overstate their willingness-to-
pay in hypothetical CV situations (Cummings,
Harrison, and Rutstr¨ om; Fox et al.; List and
Gallet; List and Shogren). This bias has gen-
erated skepticism of the CV method in gen-
eral (e.g., Diamond and Hausman) and has
raised questions about the validity of spe-
ciﬁc beneﬁt measures used in public pol-
icy. Although evidence of bias in hypothet-
ical CV applications is widespread, recent
work has suggested that CE responses are
statistically indistinguishable across hypothet-
icalandnonhypotheticaltreatments(Carlsson
and Martinsson).1 Further, many CE appli-
cations in the marketing literature implicitly
assume preferences are accurately revealed
(e.g., Louviere and Woodworth). Aside from
Carlsson and Martinsson, little work has ex-
amined the external validity of CEs.2
1 List also found no evidence of hypothetical bias in CE re-
sponses for some, but not all applications.
2 Although not a test of external validity or incentive compat-
ibility, a few studies have compared hypothetical CE estimates
with other hypothetical conjoint or hypothetical CV estimates
(e.g., Adamowicz et al., Boyle et al., Mackenzie). Several other
studies have also compared stated CEs preferences with revealed
preferences; however, the focus of these analyses was primarily
to create a better combined model rather than testing for in-
centive compatibility (e.g., Adamowicz et al., Hensher, Louviere,
and Swait; Louviere, Hensher, and Swait). A few other stud-
ies have tested for internal validity of CEs (e.g., Johnson and
Mathews).
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However, testing whether CEs are subject
to hypothetical bias is necessary to deter-
mine the reliability and validity of this val-
uation method. Rising popularity of the CE
method elevates the need for more research
to assess the merits of this particular valua-
tion approach. Several studies have expressed
concerns with CEs. Because subjects are of-
ten asked to respond to several repeated CE
questions, subject fatigue or learning may af-
fect behavior (Bradley and Daly; Johnson
and Desvousges). In addition, DeShazo and
Fermo and Swait and Adamowicz found that
complexity of the CE inﬂuenced consistency
of choices and aggregate preferences. These
problems might serve to accentuate problems
with hypothetical bias: subjects might behave
inconsistently when they do not have to back
up their choices with real commitments.
This study compares hypothetical and non-
hypothetical responses to CE questions. Al-
though many applications use CEs to value
public goods, in this application, we focus on
the incentive compatibility properties of a CE
for private goods: beef ribeye steaks with dif-




ative to test for hypothetical bias in CEs with
private goods.3
Our study generates a number of impor-
tant ﬁndings. In contrast to Carlsson and
Martinsson, our estimates suggest that hypo-
theticalCEresponsesarestatisticallydifferent
from actual CE responses. Responses to the
hypotheticalCEgenerallypredicthigherprob-
abilities of purchasing beef steaks than when
payment is actually required. Despite the ﬁnd-
ing of hypothetical bias, we ﬁnd that marginal
WTP for steak attributes is similar in the hy-
pothetical and nonhypothetical settings.
Experimental Methods
To test the incentive compatibility properties
of CEs, a random sample of consumers was
recruited to evaluate quality-differentiated
beef steaks. Beef has traditionally been mar-
ketedasahomogeneouscommodity,butsome
3 It is important to note that incentives can differ when valuing
private as opposed to public goods. Carson, Groves, and Machina
contend that conventional CV techniques are not incentive com-
patible when considering the provision of a private good in a hy-
potheticalcontext.Thus,our ﬁndingsregardingtheincentivecom-
patibility of CEs may not be extendable to public goods, which is
typically the focus of environmental valuation.
brands are beginning to appear in the market
place (i.e., Laura’s Lean, Coleman’s Natural,
Certiﬁed Angus Beef, etc.); however, these
brands are not available in all markets and
are rarely marketed together in the same store
suchthatrelativedemandforeachofthesteaks
can be directly analyzed. As such, more re-
search is needed to identify consumer prefer-
ences for different steak attributes (see Lusk
for a discussion on this issue). Three-quarter
pound ribeye steaks with varying quality at-
tributes were chosen as the unit of analysis.
Because many of the steak types were either
new or unavailable in the local marketplace,
demand for the attributes was uncertain. In
thisregard,thisstudyrepresentsaclassicaluse
of CEs to estimate potential market shares of
new products and determine relative prefer-
encesforproductattributes(e.g.,Louviereand
Woodworth; Louviere 1991).
To test the incentive compatibility of a CE,
onemustﬁrstestablishtherelevantbaselineto
compare hypothetical responses against. Fol-
lowing Shogren et al., transaction data from
a grocery store might be used in this regard.
However, there are problems with this ap-
proach. First, based upon our previous ex-
perience in working with grocery stores in
meat-purchase experiments, ﬁnding one that
wouldparticipateinthisparticularstudywould
be an arduous task. Second, collecting demo-
graphic information from each shopper pur-
chasing steaks in a store setting would pose a
major challenge. Without demographic infor-
mation, one would have to question whether
differences in real and hypothetical responses
were due to incentive compatibility or due to
differentsamplemakeups.Third,thehighcosts
and logistical problems associated with plac-
ing new products in a grocery store are pro-
hibitory. Finally, the store environment itself
could cause differences in hypothetical and
real responses (Lusk and Fox). A comparison
of store purchases and responses to a nonhy-
pothetical survey presents a joint test of the
hypothesesthattheretailenvironmentandac-
tual payment affects valuations. To isolate the
potential effect of hypothetical bias, we con-
ducted two treatments in identical environ-
ments with the only difference being whether
payment was actually required.
A second consideration in designing an ex-
periment to test for incentive compatibility of
CEs is whether to conduct within- or between-
subject tests. Carlsson and Martinsson used
a within-subject design where subjects ﬁrst












$6.75 $7.88 $9.00 $5.63 $7.88
I would choose . . .
Steaks
Figure 1. Example choice experiment question
respondedtoanonhypotheticalCE.Although
within-subject designs can generate statistical
tests with greater power, there are disadvan-
tages to this approach. The primary disadvan-
tagewithawithin-subjectdesignisthatpartici-
pationinanonhypotheticaltreatmentcanalter
subsequent behavior in a hypothetical treat-
ment or vice versa. To mitigate these potential
problems, we designed a between-subject ex-
perimentwheretwosimilarsamplesofrespon-
dentseachparticipatedindifferenttreatments:
hypothetical or nonhypothetical. In the subse-
quent analysis, we test for and reject any dif-
ferences in demographic makeups of our two
samples.
Giventheseconsiderations,randomdigitdi-
aling techniques were used to recruit experi-
mental subjects from the general population
of a midwestern college town. Subjects were
offered$40cashtoparticipateina“steakpref-
erence experiment,” to be conducted in the
meat laboratory on the local university cam-
pus.Individualsthatagreedtoparticipatewere
assigned a time and date that was convenient
for them (two-hour sessions were held several
times daily from 27 February 2002 to 3 March
2002).Conﬁrmationlettersweremailedtopar-
ticipants one week prior to the sessions to in-
crease attendance rates. Subjects participated
in one of two CE treatments: hypothetical or
nonhypothetical.
Upon arriving at the session, subjects were
paid $40 cash and completed a short de-
mographic questionnaire. Subjects were then
shown and provided an opportunity to exam-
ine ﬁve different beef ribeye steaks: a generic
steak, a guaranteed tender steak, a natural
steak, a USDA Choice steak, and a Certiﬁed
Angus Beef
 (CAB) steak. An information
sheet describing each of the beef steaks was
read aloud and distributed to participants.4
After reading the information sheet and visu-
ally examining the steaks, subjects responded
toaseriesofseventeenrepeatedCEquestions.
4 Complete experimental instructions and the information sheet
are available from the authors upon request.
In each of the CE questions, ﬁve ribeye
steaks were offered at various price levels. A
sample CE question is illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
Subjectswereaskedtoindicatewhichsteak,or
none, they preferred in each scenario. Generic
steak prices (12 oz) were varied between
$3.38,$4.50,$5.63,and$6.75.Pricesofguaran-
teed tender, natural, Choice, and CAB steaks
(12oz)werevariedbetween$5.63,$6.75,$7.88,
and $9.00. Price levels were chosen to encom-
pass the range of steak prices in local gro-
cery stores and retail prices reported by the
National Cattlemen’s Beef Association and
theU.S.DepartmentofAgriculture/Economic
Research Service. To be consistent with the
vast majority of CE studies, a “none of these”
option was also included in each choice set.5
In this set-up, there are ﬁve steaks (plus
none)variedatfourdifferentpricelevels.Sub-
jects would have to be shown 45 = 1,024 dif-
ferentchoicesetsifpresentedwitheverysteak
ateverycombinationofpricelevels.Toreduce
the number of questions respondents had to
answer,wegeneratedanorthogonalfractional
factorial design. In this design, the prices of
each steak are totally uncorrelated with the
prices of each of the other four steaks. The re-
sulting design consisted of sixteen choice sets
or scenarios. As a basis of comparison, a 17th
choice set was added where all steaks were
priced at the same level (see the Appendix
for the CE scenarios). The set-up of the CE
closelyresemblesthatinErdemandSwait(dis-
cussed in more detail in Louviere, Hensher,
and Swait).
Subjects assigned to the nonhypothetical
treatment were informed that when partici-
pants completed all CE questions, one of the
seventeen questions would be randomly se-
lected as binding by having one of the partici-
pantsdrawanumberoutofanenvelope.After
the binding scenario was determined, each
5 A “none of these” option was included to set the origin or base
of the utility scale from which other alternatives are compared
(Louviere 1988). More pragmatically, inclusion of a “none” op-
tion makes the choice task more realistic as consumers are able to
choose this option when shopping.470 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
participant purchased the steak they chose in
the binding scenario. In the experimental in-
structions, subjects were explicitly told that
actual payment would occur for the bind-
ing scenario and that they should evaluate
each scenario carefully, as all scenarios had an
equally likely chance of being binding. Sub-
jects were also told that marking the “none of
these” option was acceptable, and in the case
that “none of these” was marked in a binding
scenario, no purchase would be made.
For the hypothetical treatment, procedures
and CE questions were identical except sub-
jects were told that payment for a steak would
notactuallytakeplace.Althoughpaymentwas
not required, we asked subjects to behave as if
choices were real and binding. Subjects were
asked to take time to evaluate each scenario
as if they were going to actually have to face
the consequences of their choice. Participants
were instructed to behave, for example, as if
therewereanequallylikelychancetheywould
beheldaccountablefortheirchoiceinscenario
3 as if they were to be held accountable for
their choice in scenario 14. Subjects were told
that marking the “none of these” option was
acceptable in any scenario. Lastly, subjects in
the hypothetical treatment were asked to in-
dicate their preferences under the assumption
that only one steak would be purchased.
Analysis
A number of methods could be used to com-
pare responses across hypothetical and non-
hypotheticaltreatments.First,thefrequencyof
steakchoicesineachscenariocanbecompared
across treatments. However, testing whether
choice frequencies are equivalent across treat-
ments requires that each steak be chosen a
sufﬁcient number of times in each CE sce-
nario. In other words, if a small percentage of
individuals choose a particular steak in a par-
ticular scenario, traditional chi-squared tests
of independence across treatments are not
valid. Nevertheless, summarizing differences





preferences are similar in hypothetical and
nonhypotheticalCEs.IneachCEquestion,re-
spondents had to choose between ﬁve steaks
and the “none of these” option. Let the ith
consumer’s utility of choosing option steak j
be given by
Uij = Vij + εij (1)
where Vij is the systematic portion of the util-
ityfunctiondeterminedbythesteakattributes
and εij is a stochastic element. Assuming Vij
is linear in parameters, the functional form
of the utility function for alternative j can be
expressed as
Vij =  j +  j Pij (2)
where j = generic, guaranteed tender, natural,
Choice, and CAB steaks, Pij is the price of al-
ternative j for consumer i,  j are coefﬁcients
representing alternative speciﬁc constants for
each of the steak alternatives relative to the
“none of these” option, and  j are coefﬁcients
representingtheeffectofthejthsteakpriceon
utility for the jth steak. The probability that a
consumer chooses alternative j is
Prob{Vij + εij ≥ Vik + εik; for all k ∈ Ci}
where Ci is the choice set for respondent i,
thatis,Ci ={generic,guaranteedtender,natu-
ral,USDAChoice,CAB,none}.Inthefollow-
ing subsections, several alternative economet-
ric models are discussed that make different
assumptions about the form of equation (2) or
the distribution of εij in equation (1).
Multinomial Logit Model
If the εij’s are independently and identically
distributed across the j alternatives and N in-
dividuals with an extreme value distribution,






k∈C e Vik (3)
where   is a scale parameter that is inversely
related to the variance of the error term.
Although the scale parameter is unidenti-
ﬁable within any particular data set, one can
estimatearelativescaleparameteracrossdata
sets(SwaitandLouviere).Identifyingtherela-
tive scale parameter is important in determin-
ingwhetherdifferencesinparameterestimates
across data sets are due to differences in vari-
ance or differences in underlying preferences.
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model is used to identify the relative scale
parameter between hypothetical and non-
hypothetical treatments (Adamowicz et al.;
Hensher and Bradley; Hensher, Louviere, and
Swait). Preference equality is tested by con-
trolling for differences in scale and estimat-
ing a model that imposes the null hypothesis
of parameter equality across treatments (see
Louviere, Hensher, and Swait, p. 364).
Universal Logit Model
Despite the prevalent use of the MNL in the
literature and the relative ease with which
welfare estimates can be calculated from it,
the MNL is derived based on the indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assump-
tion. The IIA assumption results from the as-
sumption that model errors are independently
distributed across alternatives. To test for po-
tential violations of the IIA assumption, we
also estimated a universal or “mother” logit
model (McFadden, Train, and Tye).6
The universal logit model is the most gen-
eral model in the generalized extreme value
family of models, which includes the MNL
and nested logit models. In a universal logit
model, the utility of each alternative is speci-
ﬁedasafunctionoftheattributesofeachofthe
other alternatives. In this application, the util-
ity of the generic steak, for example, is a func-
tion of an alternative speciﬁc constant and the
prices of the generic, guaranteed tender, nat-
ural, Choice, and CAB steaks. The functional
form of the utility function for alternative j in
the universal logit can be expressed as




where j = generic, guaranteed tender, nat-
ural, Choice, and CAB steaks, k = generic,
guaranteed tender, natural, Choice, and CAB
steaks, Pik is the kth steak’s price for con-
sumer i, and  jk represents the effect of the
kth steak’s price on the utility for the jth steak.
In the universal logit speciﬁcation, the util-
ity function for each alternative now has own-
and cross-price effects, which clearly incorpo-
ratesanyviolationsoftheIIAassumptionthat
6 Although the issue is not explored in this article, agribusiness
managers are likely to be quite interested in substitutability be-
tween steak types. The MNL imposes a very strict structure on
cross-price elasticities, whereas the universal logit permits a very
ﬂexible structure on cross-price elasticities (see Krishnamurthi,
Raj, and Sivakumar for managerial implications derived from the
universal logit).
mightbepresentintheMNLmodel.Bytesting
the joint hypothesis that all cross-price effects
are zero, the IIA assumption is directly tested
(McFadden, Train, and Tye). To estimate the
universal logit, equation (4) is simply substi-
tuted, in place of equation (2), into equation
(3). The procedure previously discussed is still
applicable to identify the relative scale param-
eter between hypothetical and nonhypotheti-
cal treatments with the universal logit.
If violations of the IIA property are found,
a number of alternative models can be es-
timated that do not assume errors are in-
dependently distributed across alternatives.7
In this article, we consider three alternative
speciﬁcations: the heteroskedastic extreme
value (HEV) model, the multinomial probit
(MNP) model, and the random parameters
logit(RPL)model.Eachofthesethreemodels
relaxes the IIA property of the MNL, and we
presentresultsassociatedwithallthreemodels
to increase the robustness of our conclusions
and to illustrate how welfare measures might
differ across alternative speciﬁcations.
Heteroskedastic Extreme Value Model
In contrast to the MNL and Universal Logit,
which assume that error variance is equiva-
lent across steak alternatives, the HEV model
allows error variance to differ across alterna-
tives. In the HEV model, the utility function is
the same as that given in equation (1), but the
εij are assumed independently but not iden-
tically distributed for each steak alternative.
























where F(·) is the standard cdf of the extreme
valuedistribution,f(·)isthepdfoftheextreme
value distribution, and  j is the scale parame-
ter for alternative j that is inversely related to
thestandarddeviationoftheerrorcomponent
7 AlthoughtheuniversallogitrelaxestheIIAassumption,itmay
be inconsistent with utility maximization. McFadden outlines con-
ditionsanestimatedmodelmustmeettobeconsistentwithrandom
utility maximization; however, it is difﬁcult to determine ex post
whether an estimated model satisﬁes such conditions.472 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
of alternative j. Methods for computing the
integral in equation (5) are outlined in Bhat
and Louviere, Hensher, and Swait. The HEV
model permits estimation of a scale parame-
ter for each choice alternative, with the scale
of one alternative set equal to one for iden-
tiﬁcation purposes. Because different alterna-
tives have different scales, the IIA assumption
is relaxed. Applications employing the HEV
can be found in Allenby and Ginter; Bhat;
Louviere, Hensher, and Swait. As shown in
Hensher, Louviere, and Swait, the HEV can
be used to combine data sets (such as the
case with our hypothetical and nonhypothet-
ical data sets) by controlling for differences




differ across alternatives, but instead assumes
errors given in equation (1) are normally dis-
tributed. In theory the MNP model is more
generalthantheHEVmodelbecausetheMNP
model permits estimation of the entire error
covariance matrix instead of just alternative-
speciﬁc variances, as is the case with the HEV
model. As shown by Louviere, Hensher, and
Swait, the probability of choice in the MNP













where J is the choice set size and f(·)i sa
J-variate normal density function with mean
zero and J × J covariance matrix  . Com-
puting the probabilities in equation (5) can be
computationally intensive because of the need
to evaluate multiple integrals and identiﬁca-
tion of all parameters in   can be a challenge.
To put the MNP into practice, we assume all
off-diagonal correlations in   are zero. To fur-
ther ensure identiﬁcation, standard deviations
of two alternative-speciﬁc errors are restricted
to one (see discussion in Greene). This pro-
duces a model very similar to the HEV model,
but with errors assumed normally distributed
instead of extreme value. Because error vari-
ances are estimated for each alternative (up to
identiﬁcation), the IIA assumption is relaxed.
The MNP model was originally discussed in
Hausman and Wise and applications can be
foundinLouviere,Hensher,andSwait.Aswas
thecasewiththeHEVmodel,theMNPmodel




The last model we consider is the RPL. The
RPL is based on a modiﬁcation of the MNL,
but instead of taste parameters assumed con-
stant in the population, as is the case in the
MNL,theRPLallowstasteparameterstovary
in the population. The probability of choice in
the RPL model is given by




where  i is an individual-speciﬁc random dis-
turbance of unobserved heterogeneity. In gen-
eral, the coefﬁcient vector for individual i in
the RPL is  i = ¯   +   i, where ¯   is the pop-
ulation mean,   is the standard deviation of
the marginal distribution of  , and  i is a
random term assumed normally distributed
mean zero and unit standard deviation. If   =
0, then the RPL is equivalent to the MNL.
Aside from relaxing the IIA assumption, the
RPL is advantageous because random-effects
introduced by the panel-nature of the data
(i.e., each individual responded the seventeen
choice questions) can be incorporated quite
easily. Further computational details on the
RPL model can be found in Greene; Layton
and Brown; Louviere, Hensher, and Swait;
Train; and Revelt and Train.
In our application of the RPL, we assume
thatthealternative-speciﬁcconstantsareinde-
pendently normally distributed in the popula-
tion. Following Layton and Brown and Revelt
and Train, price coefﬁcients were assumed
ﬁxed in the population.8 In theory, it is possi-
ble to combine both hypothetical and nonhy-
pothetical responses and estimate the relative
scale-parameter between the two data sources
with the RPL as was the case with the MNL.
However, the likelihood function is not glob-
ally concave over the relative scale parame-
ter with the RPL, and in practice we found
the likelihood function to be quite erratic over
8 Fixingthepricecoefﬁcientsensuresthatestimatedwillingness-
to-pay will be normally distributed. It also forces all respondents
to have a negative price coefﬁcient, which would not be possible
if the coefﬁcient were assumed normally distributed. Further, we
foundthatconvergencewasaproblemifallvariableswereallowed
to be random.Lusk and Schroeder Incentive Compatibility of Choice Experiments 473
relevant ranges of relative scale. Thus, in the
analysis that follows, we do not control for dif-
ferences in scale across hypothetical and non-
hypothetical data sets in the RPL estimation.
As a result, our test of whether RPL model
parameters are equivalent across hypotheti-
cal and nonhypothetical data sets is a test of
the joint hypothesis of equality of both taste
parameters and scale. Despite this weakness,
comparisonsofhypotheticalandnonhypothet-
ical WTP calculated from the RPL are valid




WTP estimates are derived by determining
the price difference necessary to invoke in-
difference between two steak alternatives. To-
tal WTP to obtain steak alternative j versus
“none of these” is simply calculated as the ra-
tio of the alternative speciﬁc constant to the
price coefﬁcient: − j/ j.10 Marginal WTP for
steak j versus steak k can be calculated in two
ways.First,WTPtoexchangesteakalternative
j for steak alternative k can be determined by
ﬁnding the price of k that satisﬁes the equal-
ity: Vj = Vk. A problem with this approach is
that it can generate asymmetrical valuations,
with WTPjk  = WTPjk. Further, this approach
generates marginal WTP that is conditional
upon the price of other alternatives. To mit-
igate these problems, we calculate marginal
WTP for steak j versus steak k as: − j/ j +
 k/ k. That is, marginal WTP is determined
by subtracting total WTP for steak j from total
WTP for steak k.
Standard deviations of WTP are derived
by generating a distribution of 1,000 WTP
estimates using the parametric bootstrapping
method proposed by Krinsky and Robb. More
speciﬁcally, 1,000 observations were drawn
frommultivariatenormaldistributionscreated
using the coefﬁcient estimates the variance-
covariance matrices from each of the econo-
metric models. To test whether there are dif-
ferences in hypothetical and nonhypothetical
willingness-to-pay, we used the combinatorial
test mentioned in Poe, Severance-Lossin, and
Welsh and investigated further in Poe, Giraud,
9 All models reported in this article were estimated using
LIMDEP.
10 This WTP measure assumes no uncertainty regarding con-
sumerchoice;seeAdamowiczetal.foranalternativewelfaremea-
sure that incorporates choice uncertainty.
and Loomis. The combinatorial approach pro-
vides a simple unbiased, nonparametric test of
the difference in two distributions. The com-
binatorial test is carried out by comparing
the 1,000 bootstrapped values from hypothet-
ical WTP for a given steak and economet-
ric model to the 1,000 bootstrapped values
for the corresponding nonhypothetical WTP
for the same steak and econometric model.
More speciﬁcally, the difference between hy-
pothetical WTP and nonhypothetical WTP
is calculated for all possible combinations of
the bootstrapped values—that is, we calcu-
late ((hypothetical WTP)t − (nonhypothetical
WTP)z) for all t and z, where t = 1,000 boot-
strapped hypothetical WTP values and z =
1,000 nonhypothetical bootstrapped WTP. As
such, 1,000,000 differences are calculated for
each hypothesis test of interest. The propor-
tion of differences that are less than zero is the
p-value associated with the one-sided test that
the hypothetical WTP distribution is greater
than the nonhypothetical WTP distribution.11
Tests for WARP Violations
As a ﬁnal comparison of hypothetical and
nonhypothetical responses, the internal con-
sistency of an individual’s responses across the
seventeen CE questions can be tested. Be-
cause previous studies have observed incon-
sistencies across CE questions (e.g., DeShazo
and Fermo), it is important to test whether
such an effect is present here. To test for
consistency across CE questions, violations
of the weak axiom of revealed preferences
(WARP) were checked using a nonparametric
approach. Consistency with WARP is a neces-
sary condition that an individual’s preferences
are stable over the seventeen CE responses.
In its simplest form, a WARP violation oc-
curs if an individual chooses a particular steak
(e.g.,steakA)inascenariowhenanothersteak
(e.g., steak B) is less expensive, but chooses
steak B in a different scenario when steak
A was less expensive. Procedures outlined in
Chalfant and Alston were employed to test
forviolationsofWARP(seeVarian1982,1983
for further discussion on the method). Of in-
terest here is whether a greater frequency of
individuals violate WARP when they are not
heldaccountablefortheirchoicesaswhenreal
payment occurs.
11 Poe, Giraud, and Loomis provide simple computer code to
carry out the test.474 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Selected Participant Demographics by Treatment
Treatmenta
Variable Deﬁnition Nonhypothetical Hypothetical
Gender 1 = female; 0 = male 0.42b 0.41
(0.50)c (0.50)
Age Age in years 33.13 29.62
(17.55) (14.92)
Education 1 = high school; 2 = some college; 3 = technical school; 3.66 3.38
4 = associate’s degree; 5 = bachelor’s degree; (2.06) (1.98)
6 = master’s degree; 7 = J.D.; 8 = doctorate
Student 1 = full time student; 0 otherwise 0.51 0.60
(0.50) (0.50)
Income Household income level 4.63 3.76
1 = less than $10,000; 2 = $10,000 to 19,999... (4.82) (4.07)
19 = $180,000 to $189,999; 20 = more than $190,000
Number of participants 67 37
aThe null hypothesis of equality of means across treatments cannot be rejected for any of the demographics.
bReported statistics are mean values.
cThe numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
Results
Subjects were recruited as part of a larger
project on consumer demand for quality dif-
ferentiated beef. Response rates for the over-
all project were as follows: 45% of random
digit dials were working numbers, 48% of con-
tacted individuals agreed to participate in a
research session, and 85% of individuals who
agreed to take part in a session actually par-
ticipated. Overall, sixty-seven subjects partici-
pated in a nonhypothetical CE treatment and
thirty-sevenindividualsparticipatedinahypo-
thetical CE treatment.12 Table 1 reports sum-
mary statistics of basic demographics for the
two treatments. For each of the demograph-
ics reported in table 1, the null hypothesis of
equality of means across treatments cannot be
rejected.
Summary statistics of responses to each of
the seventeen CE questions are reported in
table2(pricesfortheseventeenchoicesetsare
listed in the Appendix). One result is readily
apparent: participants in the nonhypothetical
treatmentchosethe“none”optionmuchmore
frequently than participants in the hypotheti-
cal treatment. For all seventeen scenarios, the
percentageofindividualschoosing“none”was
greaterinthenonhypotheticaltreatment,with
12 There were three sessions of the nonhypothetical treatment
on Thursday at 5:10 pm (thirty-ﬁve participants), Friday at 2:00
pm (twenty-two participants), and Sunday at 5:10 pm (ten partici-
pants). There were three sessions of the hypothetical treatment on
Wednesday at 8:00 pm (sixteen participants), Sunday at 2:20 pm
(ﬁfteen participants), and Sunday at 6:30 pm (six participants).
the smallest difference between actual and
hypothetical “none” frequencies being 8.31%
(scenario 4) and the largest difference being
32.84% (scenario 7). As expected, many of
the scenarios contain steak options that were
never or infrequently chosen, precluding the
use of chi-squared tests of independence to
testfordifferencesinchoicefrequenciesacross
treatment.
Table 3 reports MNL estimates for pooled
and segmented samples. To preserve orthogo-
nality of prices across steak options, only the
ﬁrst sixteen CE scenarios shown in the ap-
pendix were included in the estimation. The
joint model restricts steak preference param-
eters to be equal across treatment and allows
for estimation of the relative scale parameter.
Results indicate that the scales of hypotheti-
cal and nonhypothetical data are statistically
equivalent (i.e., the relative scale is not statis-
tically different from one). The null hypoth-
esis of preference equality across treatments
is  nonhypothetical =  hypothetical. As shown in
Louviere,Hensher,andSwait,thetestforpref-




dom, where LLJ is the log likelihood value for
the pooled model after controlling for scale,
LLi are the log likelihood values of separate
MNL models from each treatment, K is the
number of restrictions, 10, and M is the num-
ber of treatments, 2. For these data, parame-
ter equality is strongly rejected ( 2 = 106.8;
p < 0.01). Thus, we reject the hypothesis of
equality of hypothetical and nonhypothetical
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Table 3. Multinomial Logit Model Estimates: Comparison of Hypothetical and
Nonhypothetical Treatments
Model
Independent Variable Joint Nonhypotheticala Hypotheticala
Alternative speciﬁc constants
Generic (GEN) 4.27∗ 3.79∗ 5.28∗
(0.45)b (0.55) (0.62)
Guaranteed tender (GT) 9.29∗ 9.28∗ 9.56∗
(0.80) (0.93) (1.10)
Natural (NAT) 7.39∗ 6.46∗ 8.65∗
(0.93) (1.22) (1.26)
USDA Choice (CHO) 10.81∗ 9.90∗ 12.77∗
(0.78) (0.76) (1.12)
Certiﬁed Angus Beef (CAB) 10.69∗ 11.48∗ 9.75∗
(0.73) (0.81) (0.94)
Own-price effects
GEN price −1.06∗ −1.09∗ −1.03∗
(0.11) (0.14) (0.14)
GT price −1.46∗ −1.52∗ −1.35∗
(0.13) (0.15) (0.18)
NAT price −1.28∗ −1.24∗ −1.28∗
(0.15) (0.20) (0.21)
CHO price −1.59∗ −1.51∗ −1.75∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.17)




Log Likelihood −1942.2 −1261.4 −627.4
Number of observationsd 1664 1072 592
∗Statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level or lower.
aEstimates are adjusted for differences in scale.
bNumbers in parentheses are standard errors.
cScale of nonhypothetical responses is relative to scale of hypothetical responses (restricted to equal one).
dEach respondent answered seventeen CE questions, sixteen of which were used in the estimation.
Because of potential violations of the IIA
assumption, we also estimated universal logit
models.13TheIIAassumptionistestedbycom-
paring the likelihood function values from the
MNL models in table 3 to those from the
universal logit. The likelihood function values
for the universal logit were as follows: joint
model =− 1908.8; nonhypothetical model =
−1245.8; and hypothetical model =− 597.7.
Likelihood ratio tests indicate that the IIA
assumption is rejected for the joint model
( 2 = 66.9; p < 0.01), the nonhypothetical
model ( 2 = 31.3; p = 0.051), and the hy-
pothetical model ( 2 = 59.5; p < 0.01). Be-
cause of the generality of the universal logit,
we also tested for equality of taste parameters
acrossnonhypotheticalandhypotheticaltreat-
ments with this speciﬁcation. Employing the
13 To conserve space, estimates from the universal logit models,
which contain thirty coefﬁcients each, are not reported in this ar-
ticle. These results are available from the authors upon request.
test for preference regularity outlined above
indicates that nonhypothetical responses are
statistically different from hypothetical re-
sponses ( 2 = 130.7; p < 0.01). Thus, even
after controlling for differences in variance
and allowing for a more general utility spec-
iﬁcation, we reject the hypothesis that subject
behavior was equivalent in hypothetical and
nonhypothetical treatments.14
Althoughtheuniversallogitisaverygeneral
model of consumer behavior, it can be incon-
sistent with random utility maximization. As
such, we report results for the HEV, MNP, and
RPL models as shown in table 4. For each esti-
mationmethod,wereportthreemodels:ajoint
14 Following McFadden, Train, and Tye, we introduced the de-
mographic variables reported in table 1 into the universal logit to
attempt to mitigate the IIA violation. Even when demographic
variables were introduced into the model, the IIA assumption is
still violated and we still reject the hypothesis of equality of hypo-
thetical and nonhypothetical responses.Lusk and Schroeder Incentive Compatibility of Choice Experiments 477
Table 4. ComparisonofHypotheticalandNonhypotheticalData:HEV,MNP,andRPLModels
Heteroscedastic Extreme Multinomial Probit Random Parmaters
Value Models Models Logit Models
Independent
Variables Joint Non-hyp Hyp Joint Non-hyp Hyp Joint Non-hyp Hyp
Alternative speciﬁc constants
Generic 3.90∗ 3.79∗ 12.33∗ 5.68∗ 2.23∗ 8.53∗ 5.54∗ 4.01∗ 11.30∗
(0.33) (1.31) (4.73) (0.92) (0.47) (2.68) (0.78) (0.73) (3.03)
GT 4.20∗ 4.27∗ 6.79∗ 7.44∗ 4.04∗ 7.13∗ 8.97∗ 8.49∗ 11.21∗
(0.37) (0.80) (1.52) (1.02) (0.70) (1.40) (0.73) (0.86) (1.79)
Natural 3.97∗ 3.54∗ 6.57∗ 6.22∗ 3.91∗ 10.96∗ 7.81∗ 5.96∗ 12.57∗
(0.34) (1.09) (1.56) (0.94) (1.40) (3.99) (1.26) (1.18) (2.83)
Choice 4.582∗ 5.69∗ 7.95∗ 7.84∗ 3.96∗ 8.48∗ 10.38∗ 9.09∗ 14.85∗
(0.54) (1.05) (1.63) (0.91) (0.52) (1.59) (0.61) (0.72) (1.43)
CAB 4.81∗ 7.55∗ 7.17∗ 8.66∗ 6.57∗ 8.00∗ 10.40∗ 10.94∗ 11.68∗
(0.62) (1.52) (1.40) (0.94) (0.41) (0.89) (0.60) (1.10) (1.29)
Own-price effects
Generic −0.33∗ −1.10∗ −3.27∗ −1.41∗ −0.63∗ −2.13∗ −1.51∗ −1.19∗ −2.76∗
(0.14) (0.46) (1.46) (0.27) (0.15) (0.77) (0.23) (0.22) (0.87)
GT −0.22∗ −0.61∗ −0.85∗ −1.06∗ −0.63∗ −1.00∗ −1.41∗ −1.39∗ −1.61∗
(0.08) (0.15) (0.27) (0.17) (0.12) (0.23) (0.12) (0.14) (0.29)
Natural −0.22∗ −0.64∗ −0.87∗ −1.00∗ −0.80∗ −1.79∗ −1.40∗ −1.16∗ −1.96∗
(0.09) (0.23) (0.30) (0.17) (0.29) (0.72) (0.24) (0.21) (0.49)
Choice −0.27∗ −0.80∗ −0.91∗ −1.03∗ −0.55∗ −1.12∗ −1.52∗ −1.38∗ −2.03∗
(0.11) (0.18) (0.26) (0.14) (0.09) (0.24) (0.09) (0.11) (0.21)
CAB −0.30∗ −1.11∗ −0.80∗ −1.16∗ −0.98∗ −1.07∗ −1.52∗ −1.65∗ −1.56∗
(0.12) (0.26) (0.22) (0.11) (0.06) (0.13) (0.09) (0.18) (0.19)
Scale/standard deviation parametersa
Non-hyp generic 3.36∗ 0.94∗ 2.01∗ 1.01∗ 1.73∗ 1.09∗
(1.41) (0.34) (0.37) (0.22) (0.42) (0.50)
Non-hyp GT 5.56∗ 2.15∗ 1.13∗ 0.67∗ 0.18 0.06
(2.07) (0.64) (0.20) (0.14) (0.49) (0.51)
Non-hyp natural 5.11∗ 1.41∗ 1.30∗ 1.36∗ 1.15∗ 0.67
(2.14) (0.43) (0.23) (0.43) (0.55) (0.65)
Non-hyp choice 5.09∗ 1.68∗ 0.84∗ 0.26 0.06 0.16
(2.14) (0.42) (0.17) (0.19) (0.22) (0.30)
Non-hyp CAB 4.109∗ 1.16∗ 1.09∗ 1.00 0.03 0.61
(1.66) (0.30) (0.14) (0.33) (0.48)
Non-hyp None 0.49∗ 1.00 2.65∗ 1.00 ––
(0.03) (0.26)
Hyp generic 2.70∗ 0.31∗ 2.58∗ 3.04∗ 1.73∗ 3.67∗
(1.12) (0.12) (0.48) (1.05) (0.42) (1.29)
Hyp GT 5.97∗ 1.36∗ 1.08∗ 1.03∗ 0.18 0.84
(2.31) (0.46) (0.22) (0.28) (0.49) (0.58)
Hyp natural 4.06∗ 1.15∗ 1.74∗ 2.20∗ 1.15∗ 1.78∗
(1.72) (0.41) (0.31) (0.81) (0.55) (0.73)
Hyp choice 6.27∗ 2.57∗ 0.41∗ 0.62∗ 0.06 0.23
(2.88) (1.00) (0.17) (0.27) (0.22) (0.42)
Hyp CAB 5.45∗ 2.66∗ 1.00 1.00 0.03 0.46
(2.42) (1.14) (0.33) (0.39)
Hyp none 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 ––
Log Likelihood −2031 −1272 −612 −1899 −1257 −614 −1937 −1259 −615
# Obs 1664 1072 592 1664 1072 592 1164 1072 592
Test for equality 294.8∗ 55.2∗ 125.4∗
∗Statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level or lower.
aEstimates are scale parameters of alternative speciﬁc errors in the heteroscedastic extreme value models, standard deviations of alternative speciﬁc errors in
the multinomial probit models, and standard deviations of the alternative speciﬁc constants in random parameters logit models, respectively.478 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
model combining hypothetical and nonhypo-
thetical responses, a model with nonhypothet-
ical data only, and a model with hypothetical
data only. The ﬁrst three columns of results
in table 4 pertain to the HEV model. The
joint HEV model restricts alternative-speciﬁc
and own-price effects to be equal across treat-
ments, but allows the scale (error variance)
to differ across alternative and treatment. Be-
cause the scale is inversely related to error
variance, a higher scale implies a greater error
variance for the alternative. An examination
of the scale estimates indicates more noise ex-
ists in the generic steak and none alternatives
for both the hypothetical and nonhypothetical
treatmentsthanforanyoftheothersteakalter-
natives. The ratio of nonhypothetical and hy-
pothetical scale parameters is 1.24, 0.93, 1.26,
0.81, 0.75, and 0.47 for the generic, guaranteed
tender, natural, Choice, CAB, and “none” al-
ternatives, respectively, implying a greater er-
ror variance for some alternatives in the hy-
pothetical setting and a greater error variance
for some alternatives in the nonhypothetical
setting. The most noticeable difference is with
respect to the “none” option in the nonhy-
pothetical treatment, which exhibited greater
noise relative to other steak alternatives in ei-
ther treatment. The next two columns report
separate HEV models for the nonhypotheti-
cal and hypothetical data, respectively. A like-
lihood ratio test strongly rejects the hypothe-
sisthathypotheticalandnonhypotheticaltaste
parametersareequalevenafteraccountingfor
differences in variance at the alternative level.
The next set of estimates corresponds to
the MNP model. Again, we ﬁrst report a
joint model that imposes equality of taste pa-
rameters across treatment, but allows differ-
ences in variance across alternative. Rather
than estimating scale parameters, the MNP
directly estimates the standard deviation of
the alternative-speciﬁc error component. For
identiﬁcation purposes, two standard devia-
tionsmustbesetequaltoone.Resultsfromthe
MNP are generally consistent with the HEV
model;thegenericand“none”alternativesare
associated with the greatest noise. Again, a
likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that
hypotheticalandnonhypotheticaltasteparam-
eters are equal even after accounting for dif-
ferences in variance at the alternative level.
The last three columns in table 4 report
results from the RPL speciﬁcation. Results
suggest that consumers exhibited signiﬁcant
heterogeneity in preferences for generic and
natural steaks, but were relatively homoge-
neous in their preferences for the other steak
types. Because of the difﬁculties previously
mentioned, a relative scale parameter was
not estimated to determine whether there
were signiﬁcant differences in variance across
hypothetical and nonhypothetical responses.
Nonetheless, a likelihood ratio test rejects the
joint hypothesis of equivalence of hypotheti-
cal and nonhypothetical taste parameters and
scale.
The estimation results from all models over-
whelming indicate that hypothetical and non-
hypothetical CE generated different taste pa-
rameters. This result is robust to alternative
speciﬁcations of the utility function as shown
by the universal logit, and is robust to alterna-
tive speciﬁcations of unobserved heterogene-
ity as shown by the HEV, MNP, and RPL
models. To illustrate the differences in hy-
pothetical and nonhypothetical responses, we
also plotted predicted probabilities of pur-
chase or “market shares” for the generic steak
giventheHEVmodelestimates.Figure2illus-
trates nonhypothetical and hypothetical sim-
ulated market shares for the generic steak
in the hypothetical and nonhypothetical con-
texts. The hypothetical market share is clearly
greater than nonhypothetical market shares at
allpricelevelsforthegenericsteak.Similarﬁg-
ures from other steaks and econometric mod-
els are available from the authors.
As another means of evaluating the incen-
tive compatibility properties of the CE, WTP
estimates were compared across hypothetical
and nonhypothetical treatments for each of
the models estimated (table 5). Results indi-
cate that total WTP to obtain each of the ﬁve
ribeye steaks versus having no steak at all is
greater in the hypothetical than in the non-
hypothetical setting. This difference is statisti-
callysigniﬁcantforallsteaksexceptthegeneric
steak in the HEV model according to the non-
parametric combinatorial test. The direction
of bias is consistent with the extant literature
on hypothetical bias. List and Gallet, in a sum-
mary of twenty-nine experimental studies, re-
ported that average subjects overstate their
willingness-to-pay in hypothetical settings by
a factor of 3. Data in table 5 indicate that sub-
jects overstated their WTP, on average across
steaks,byafactorofabout1.2,regardlessofes-
timation method. Although hypothetical bias
exists in this CE, it appears small relative to
the average of other studies.
Despite the fact that hypothetical WTP is
greater than actual WTP, marginal WTP to
exchange steaks with different attributes is,
in most cases, similar across treatment. The




























Figure 2. Predicted market shares for generic steak: HEV model
exchange a generic steak for the other steaks
as calculated from the HEV model. Although
thenonparametriccombinatorialtestindicates
these differences are statistically signiﬁcant
for the HEV model, this result is not robust
across the MNP and RPL models. For most of
the cases reported in table 5, marginal WTP
in the hypothetical context was not statisti-
cally different than marginal willingness-to-
pay when actual payment was required. Thus,
although overall WTP for steaks is greater in
Table 5. Comparison of Nonhypothetical and Hypothetical Willingness-to-Pay
Heteroscedastic Extreme Multinomial Probit Random Parameters
Value Models Models Logit Models
Willingness-to-Pay Non- p- Non- p- Non- p-
for... a hypb Hypb Valuec hypb Hypb Valuec hypb Hypb Valuec
Total willingness-to-pay
Generic versus none $3.46 $3.77 0.27 $3.39 $4.09 0.09 $3.54 $4.01 0.01
GT versus none $6.98 $7.99 0.11 $6.12 $6.97 0.02 $6.44 $7.11 0.00
Natural versus none $5.54 $7.52 0.03 $5.13 $6.43 0.02 $4.90 $6.13 0.00
Choice versus none $7.09 $8.74 0.01 $6.59 $7.31 0.10 $7.18 $7.59 0.00
CAB versus none $6.84 $8.97 0.00 $6.63 $7.47 0.00 $6.72 $7.48 0.00
Marginal willingness-to-pay
GT versus generic $3.52 $4.23 0.20 $2.73 $2.87 0.35 $2.89 $3.10 0.38
Natural versus generic $2.08 $3.75 0.06 $1.74 $2.34 0.13 $1.36 $2.12 0.12
Choice versus generic $3.63 $4.97 0.04 $3.21 $3.22 0.51 $3.64 $3.58 0.50
CAB versus generic $3.38 $5.20 0.02 $3.25 $3.38 0.25 $3.18 $3.47 0.37
Natural versus GT −$1.43 −$0.47 0.16 −$0.99 −$0.54 0.15 −$1.53 −$0.98 0.11
Choice versus GT $0.11 $0.74 0.21 $0.47 $0.35 0.77 $0.75 $0.47 0.69
CAB versus GT −$0.14 $0.98 0.09 $0.52 $0.51 0.40 $0.28 $0.37 0.50
Choice versus natural $1.55 $1.21 0.67 $1.46 $0.88 0.94 $2.28 $1.46 0.97
CAB versus natural $1.29 $1.45 0.44 $1.51 $1.04 0.85 $1.82 $1.35 0.91
CAB versus choice −$0.25 $0.24 0.19 $0.04 $0.16 0.16 −$0.46 −$0.11 0.28
aWTP values are derived from models in table 4. WTP values are for 12 oz steaks.
bReported statistics are point estimate of WTP.
cp-Values report results of the one-sided test that the hypothetical WTP distribution > the nonhypothetical WTP distribution for each corresponding steak
pair. p-Values were determined by applying the nonparametric combinatorial method (Poe, Giraud, and Loomis) to 1,000 bootstrapped WTP estimates
calculated using the Krinsky–Robb bootstrapping method.
the hypothetical treatment than in the nonhy-
pothetical treatment, marginal WTP between
steaks in the hypothetical setting is similar to
that in the nonhypothetical treatment.
The last comparison of hypothetical and
nonhypotheticalresponsesinvolvedtestingfor
WARP violations. The frequency of WARP
violations was extremely low for both treat-
ments. Only four individuals (5.8%) in the
nonhypothetical treatment and two individ-
uals (5.4%) in the hypothetical treatment480 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
had a WARP violation. For those individuals
that violated WARP, at most two violations
were found (out of a possible 136 violations).
Overall, across all individuals and possible
comparisons, only 0.05% of nonhypothetical
and 0.06% of hypothetical responses violated
WARP. These results indicate that individuals
in both treatments behaved consist with the
weakaxiomofrevealedpreferencesacrossthe
seventeen CE scenarios. Even though partici-
pants in the hypothetical treatment were not
held accountable for their choices, they be-
haved in a manner consistent with utility max-
imization that would imply stable preferences
across choice sets.
Conclusions
This study compared hypothetical and ac-
tual choices in a study of consumer demand
for quality-differentiated beef. The predicted
probability of purchasing beef steaks was gen-
erally higher in the hypothetical versus non-
hypothetical setting (as much as 30% higher
for some steaks) and average willingness-to-
pay to obtain steaks in the hypothetical setting
was about 1.2 times that in the nonhypotheti-
cal setting. However, marginal willingness-to-
pay to exchange steaks with differing quality
attributes was, in general, equivalent in hypo-
thetical and nonhypothetical settings. In fact,
in two cases, marginal willingness-to-pay was
signiﬁcantly greater in the hypothetical than
in the nonhypothetical setting. We also found
that consumer preferences across the seven-
teen CE questions were as stable in the hypo-
thetical context as when payment was actually
required.
That we found evidence of hypothetical
bias in a CE where Carlsson and Martins-
son did not is likely attributable to a couple
of factors. Carlsson and Martinsson’s CE did
not include a “none of these” option, which
forced subjects to make a choice that included
some level of payment. In contrast, we al-
lowed subjects to opt out of making a pur-
chase by choosing “none of these.” In addi-
tion, Carlsson and Martinsson only analyzed
marginal willingness-to-pay, whereas we ana-
lyzed both marginal and total willingness-to-
pay. In fact, our results are consistent with
those of Carlsson and Martinsson with regard
to marginal willingness-to-pay.
For agribusiness applications, it should be
straightforward to conduct nonhypothetical
valuations following protocol outlined in this
article, which, as we show, will likely yield dif-
ferentresultsthanahypotheticalstudy.Under-
standing which value elicitation technique to
employandwhethervaluationsshouldbecon-
ductedinanonhypotheticalcontextwouldcer-
tainly be enhanced by future research where
comparable retail market-level data exist. The
transportationliteraturecomparingstatedand
revealed preferences has found that stated
preferences provide reasonable estimates of
marginal changes in quality attributes, but
poorlypredictactualmarketshares(Louviere,
Hensher, and Swait). We observe a similar re-
lationshipbetweenhypotheticalandnonhypo-
thetical responses to a CE, and in that regard,
hypotheticalCEresponsesmayprovideagood
approximationtochangesinmarketshareand
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